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ABSTRACT 
The use of social media has spread into many different areas including marketing, customer 
service, and corporate disclosure. However, our understanding of the timely effect of 
financial reporting information on Twitter is still limited. In this paper, we examine the timely 
effect of financial reporting information on Twitter in the Australian context, as reflected in 
the follow-up stock market reaction. With the use of event methodology and comparative 
setting, we find that financial reporting disclosure on Twitter reduces the information 
asymmetry level. This is evidenced by reduction of bid-ask spread and increase of share 
trading volume. The results of this study imply that financial reporting disclosure on social 
media assists the dissemination of information and the stock market response to this 
information3. 
INTRODUCTION 
                                                            
1 Corresponding author, email: feng.xiong@connect.qut.edu.au. 
2 The authors would like to thank participants in the AFAANZ conference 2015 (Hobart, Australia). The authors 
would also like to special thank Dr Chrisann Palm, Dr Paul Andon, and Dr Niamh Brennan for providing 
valuable feedbacks. 
3 Data supplied by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) on behalf of ASX. 
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Twitter exerts a significant influence on corporate disclosure in today’s interconnected 
business environment (Blankespoor, Miller, and White, 2014). Twitter is a social media tool 
that allows users to produce and consume information by following or being followed by 
other users (Saeed and Sinnappan, 2011). That is, Twitter allows users to build their own 
online community or network, then exchange information with others (Magro, Ryan, Sharp, 
and Ryan, 2009). In just 140 characters per post4, Twitter has been used in marketing, 
customer service, and financial reporting press releases, to name just a few applications 
(Knights, 2007; Fraser, 2009; Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
Financial reporting is a type of corporate disclosure that is used to increase the stock market 
information level (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Such financial information could relate to annual 
financial performance, merger and acquisition announcement and shares repurchase offers etc. 
With the increasing trend of using Twitter for financial reporting, business owners, investors 
and regulators face a new series of challenges that stem from this issue (Ryan, 2012; Polites, 
2013; Quilter, 2013).  
One example of this challenge is the recent investigation of Netflix Inc., a provider of on-
demand internet streaming media (including news, drama and movies) based in the United 
States (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). In this case, the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of Netflix Inc. posted specific company information concerning Netflix Inc. on his 
own Facebook page. The CEO deemed the content of the Facebook post as non-material 
information. This simple act of posting on social media instigated an official investigation by 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to determine if this disclosure was in 
violation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD). The RegFD legislation in the U.S. requires 
listed companies to provide fair disclosure to all stakeholders, with the aim to achieve 
fairness in the spectrum of information available to the general public. 
The above Netflix Inc. case, when considered alongside other similar situations (see for 
example, a dramatic drop and rebound in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Kwek, 2013)), 
makes it crucial to examine and understand the process and effectiveness of using social 
media channels like Twitter in disseminating financial information. Based on the argument 
that information asymmetry between manager and stakeholder can be reduced through 
corporate disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001), previous literature (Blankespoor et al., 2014; 
Prokofieva, 2015) had demonstrated that the increase of corporate disclosure on Twitter is 
                                                            
4 Twitter post is more common called as ‘Tweet’. 
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significantly related to the reduction of information asymmetry. This study further 
investigates how the stock market reacts to financial reporting on Twitter, from the angle of 
market microstructure observation. The findings show that financial reporting on Twitter 
actually reduces the level of information asymmetry. Similar to previous literature, this 
reduction of information asymmetry is evidenced by smaller bid-ask spread and larger share 
trading volume. Further, this study also reveals that information asymmetry is more 
significantly reduced when ASX listed companies publish multiple Twitter posts concerning 
financial reporting in comparison to a single post. In addition, small market capital ASX 
listed companies are more likely to reduce their information asymmetry with financial 
reporting tweets, even if this is a single Twitter post. This is not observed for large market 
capital companies. 
This rest of the paper is organised as follows. The current literature on the use of Twitter for 
financial reporting disclosure and relevant theoretical framework are discussed, followed by 
the development of hypotheses. The research design is then further outlined. Then the results 
are presented and discussed. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Twitter was created in March 2006 as a micro-blogging tool. It allows users to share views 
and information within a 140-character post. Distinct from Facebook and LinkedIn (which 
require a pre-existed relationship) Twitter enables a rapid and wide-reaching social network 
to be readily built, thus serving as an excellent platform for communication between 
companies and investors (Pinkston, 2009). Due to the characteristics of instant sharing and 
interaction between users, the application of Twitter has expanded to many different fields, 
including news distribution, marketing/promotion, customer service and human resources 
(Case and King, 2011). As Pizzani (2010) notes, a media study conducted among Global 500 
companies in 2010 showed that of 79 percent of companies that use social media, 65 percent 
had Twitter accounts. Further, this study (Pizzani, 2010) also indicated that Twitter is the 
most frequently used social media channel, comparing with Facebook (54 percent), YouTube 
(50 percent) and corporate blogs (33 percent). 
The uses of Twitter can be seen in two different layers. In the first layer, Twitter is recognised 
as a new communication channel in the era of social media, which has been used for 
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marketing, consumer service enquiry and other business purposes (Xiong and MacKenzie, 
2015). In the second layer, the rich information content within Twitter is recognised as an 
important database. Several previous studies have used the information content of tweets 
(including sentiments), to explain or predict historical or future stock market movement  
(Bollen and Mao, 2011; Rao and Srivastava, 2012; Zhang, Fuehres, and Gloor, 2012). The 
current Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) theory (Fama, 1970) states that stock price 
represents the current level of information for the specific stock, given the stock market is 
efficient. However, it is possible for human sentiments, such as optimistic or pessimistic 
moods, to influence investors’ decisions on investments. The use of rich information on 
Twitter to obtain macro-level mood (or sentiment) has appeared in recent studies (Bollen and 
Mao, 2011; Rao and Srivastava, 2012; Zhang et al., 2012). They find found a significant 
relation between sentiments of tweets and historical (and future) movement of the stock 
market. To improve the accuracy of this type of prediction, follow-up research focused on 
financial reporting related information on Twitter, instead of the macro-level mood (or 
sentiment) across all tweets. Taking the tweets that contain the dollar-tagged ticket symbol of 
individual stocks (such as $CBA for Commonwealth Bank of Australia) as their sample, 
Sprenger, Tumasjan, Sandner, and Welpe (2014) categorise 249,553 English-Language 
stock-related tweets into “Buy” (Positive), “Hold” (Neutral) and “Sell” (Negative) signals. 
They then find a significant relation between the level of “Bullishness” (Positive signal, 
which is “Buy”) and the current market trading volume. Further, similar effects were also 
found in the variables of tweet volume and stock price volatility. 
While the above literature reveals that general or specific financial information on Twitter 
may explain or inform historical or future stock market movement, an understanding of how 
the stock market reacts to financial reporting disclosure on Twitter is still missing. As 
discussed by Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014), there are two prospects of media coverage: 
information content and attention gathering. From the prospect of information content, media 
coverage provides investors with valuable information for investment decisions. However, 
from the salience (or signalling) view, media coverage increases investors’ attention through 
conspicuous, attention gathering behaviour, not necessarily by the information content itself 
(Solomon et al., 2014). Using the investors’ allocation of mutual fund investment as an 
example, Solomon et al. (2014) find a strong positive relation between fund flows and the 
salience of media-covered holdings. In contrast, there is little relation between fund flows and 
the level of information that holdings disclosed to market. This same phenomenon applies in 
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the research of financial reporting disclosure on Twitter, as well as general social media 
outlets. It is important to ask: does financial reporting disclosure on Twitter only represent 
sentiments, which predict the future stock market movement? Or, does such financial 
reporting tweet provide useful information to investors, which inform their future trading 
activities?  
A few recent studies (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015) attempt to answer the 
second question. These studies confirm the relation between enhanced disclosure during 
earnings (or all) announcement periods and the reduction of information asymmetry level, 
both in the U.S. and Australia. For example, in a study of U.S. information technology firms, 
Blankespoor et al. (2014) find that greater tweeting behaviour during the earning 
announcement period is associated with lower bid-ask spread and greater market depth. 
However, effects of tweeting on information asymmetry only apply to low visibility firms, 
which traditionally do not attract too much media attention because they are not big firms. 
This reduction of information asymmetry is also observed as larger share trading volume, 
after enhanced tweeting activity. Based on Blankespoor et al. (2014)’s model, (Prokofieva, 
2015) conducts a similar study with ASX Top 200 companies in the Australia context. 
(Prokofieva, 2015) finds that low visibility companies (non-S&P/ASX 100) have a higher 
proportion of tweets in comparison to high visibility companies (S&P/ASX 100). More 
importantly, this study (Prokofieva, 2015) demonstrates that Twitter activity among low 
visibility companies has a greater effect in reducing information asymmetry (level of 
abnormal bid-ask spread), in comparison with high visibility companies. 
Since previous literature had investigated the relation between corporate disclosure on 
Twitter and the change of information asymmetry level, a study that reveals the stock market 
reaction mechanism is still missing. The current study endeavours to fill this gap. Distinct 
from previous OLS regression analysis, this study uses Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (WSRT) 
in a comparative setting to reveal the different market reactions following financial reporting 
disclosure on Twitter. From the angle of market microstructure, this study intends to provide 
further evidence to present the stock market reaction following financial reporting disclosure 
on Twitter. This will inform future regulation and market design. According to the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first study of its kind in the Australian context.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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According to Fama (1970), the EMH theory states that stock price represents the current level 
of information (both private and public) in the stock market, dependent on the market 
efficiency level. Fama (1970) suggests that there are three different types of efficient markets: 
strong, semi-strong, and weak. In a weak efficient market, future stock price cannot be 
predicted through the analysis of existing information because of the existence of private 
information, which is controlled by certain parties for private trading. The stock price in a 
weak efficient market follows a random walk. In a strong efficient market, the stock price is 
determined after considering all available information, and there is no existence of private 
information. The stock market reaction is fully informed under a strong efficient market 
regime (Fama, 1970). Following the above arguments, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
stock market is recognised as a semi-strong stock market, as discussed below. 
Under the current continuous disclosure regime in Australia, ASX listed companies are 
required to lodge material information with ASX and wait for confirmation, prior to 
disclosing such information in any other corporate disclosure channel. However, this 
continuous disclosure regime also provides grounds for argument by ASX listed companies 
that some material information should remain confidential, such as an ongoing discussion of 
merger and acquisition proposals. Therefore, the ASX stock market should be deemed as a 
semi-strong efficient share market. This means that the arrival of new information, which has 
not been revealed to the share market before, will impact the stock market movement. 
While EMH outlines how stock price movement is determined based on the information 
environment in different efficient market settings, the market microstructure model explains 
the process of how the stock price is formed (O'Hara, 1999). There are many different market 
microstructure models and trading processes (Garman, 1976). In the ASX stock market, both 
buyer and seller post the stock price that they are willing to trade, and a trade will then be 
formed and executed if there is a mutual agreement about the proposed stock price. The stock 
price represents an investor’s expectation of the entity’s future performance. It is normal for 
investors to have different expectations. This may be due to different levels of information 
held by various investors. The difference between the buying and selling prices is called the 
bid-ask spread, which has been widely used as a proxy for information asymmetry (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis, 2008; Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
In a semi-strong efficient stock market, new information that flows into the stock market 
impacts on the trend of share market movement, as it changes the information environment 
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between investors. For example, before the release of a company’s annual report, there may 
be significantly different expectations among investors regarding the entity’s performance. 
After the announcement of this annual report, such difference between investors will reduce. 
Therefore, the change of bid-ask spread is considered as an important proxy, as it measures 
the difference of investors’ expectations of an entity’s performance. This means that a 
reduction of bid-ask spread indicates the improvement of information environment, and vice 
versa. When listed companies post financial reporting information on Twitter, followers of 
the Twitter account will receive this information when they next refresh their Twitter pages, 
or log in to their Twitter accounts. In addition, these financial reporting tweets may be 
automatically ‘pushed’ to Twitter users as well as financial professionals for viewing (Alden, 
2013). According to this rapid information dissemination mechanism of Twitter, it is 
expected that when financial reporting information is disclosed by an ASX listed company, 
the information gap between buyers and sellers will shrink, as investors adjust their 
expectations of the company performance accordingly. This will also lead to the decrease of 
bid-ask spread. In addition, when investors come closer to the mutual agreement of company 
performance, the share trading volume will also increase. Therefore, this study uses bid-ask 
spread and sharing trading volume as the proxies for information asymmetry, as the increase 
of available information will encourages more investors to trade on a larger scale (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). 
Hypothesis 
Based on the above discussion, this study presents the follow hypotheses: 
Following the disclosure of financial information on Twitter: 
H1: The share trading volume increases; 
H2: The bid-ask spread level decreases. 
 
Data and Method 
Data and Sample 
This study requires two main sets of data. The first set of data covers the independent 
variable, which are the financial reporting tweets. The second set of data covers the 
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dependent variables, which is the trading data, including bid-ask spread and share trading 
volume. 
Following the approach of Xiong, Prasad, and Chapple (2015), the first set of data (financial 
reporting tweets) was collected through a third party service provider website 
(www.twimemachine.com). These financial reporting tweets were then filtered and 
categorised to constitute the final sample (see the methods as discussed in Xiong et al. 
(2015)). This study investigates ASX 500 companies, in which 82 had Twitter accounts that 
disclosed financial reporting disclosure. According to the requirement discussed in the 
method section, 128 events were identified for further examination. The second set of data 
(trading data for selected events) was retrieved via the SIRCA Australia Equities database 
(www.sirca.com.au). 
Method 
To investigate the market reaction following financial reporting disclosure on Twitter, it is 
necessary to build a control for a ‘normal’ market reaction following the traditional ASX 
announcement in the absence of financial reporting disclosure on Twitter.  In this study, event 
methodology constitutes the fundamental research design. 
Event methodology has been widely used in peer-reviewed research (see for example, Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000; Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm, 2010; Reddy and Gordon, 2010; 
Blankespoor et al., 2014). To investigate the economic effect of increased disclosure, Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) use event methodology to investigate the impact of tightened 
accounting standards. They use the monthly average of bid-ask spread as the proxy for 
information asymmetry. Through comparison of this proxy value before and after the change 
of standards for financial statements, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) are able to review the 
impact of increased disclosure. In the Australian context, Reddy and Gordon (2010) also 
apply event methodology to evaluate the effect of environmental disclosure by listed 
companies. In their study, abnormal return is used as the dependent variable proxy of effect. 
Reddy and Gordon (2010) consider the environmental disclosure publication date as the event 
day, then investigate whether the environmental disclosure assists in improving the 
companies’ abnormal return. Since the research aim of the present study is in line with these 
previous studies (i.e. to review the economic consequences following financial reporting 
disclosure on Twitter), this study likewise follows the event methodology approach. 
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As depicted in Figure 1, a traditional event methodology approach involves the identification 
of ‘Pre-Period’, ‘Pre-Event Window’ and ‘Post-Event Window’.  In a previous study 
(Prokofieva, 2015), the event period is defined as one day prior to and one day after the 
selected event day, which constitute a three-day event window. Since this study focuses on 
the economic consequences following financial reporting disclosure on Twitter, a one-day 
‘Post-Event Window’ is identified for further investigation. In addition, since the information 
environment is constantly changing, the market reactions for the same stock between two 
trading days after the same ASX announcement could be significantly different. This 
variability of market reaction is called ‘static market reaction’. This means that the change of 
market reaction between two trading days is not the result of the change of information 
content within the same ASX announcement: it is because of the change of market reaction 
manner. For example, the market reaction speed based on ASX announcement could be 
faster, due to the speed of trading technology, such as algorithm trading. In contrast, the 
market reaction speed could be slower, for instance if the sector that the particular stock falls 
in is not in favour during a certain period of time. To address this issue of ‘static market 
reaction’, previous studies (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015) use the ‘Pre-Period’ 
window under event methodology. Through the use of the ‘Pre-Period’ window, the ‘static 
market reaction’ can be captured and then isolated from the market trading data of the event 
and control periods. This treatment of ‘static market reaction’ through the use of ‘Pre-Period’ 
was also utilised by Frino, Lecce, and Segara (2011). They used ‘Pre-Period’ for both event 
and control periods, which extended from 90 days to 1 day before the event and control 
periods. The comparison of trading data between event and control periods becomes more 
reasonable after isolating the ‘static market reaction’ as calculated from the ‘Pre-Period’ data. 
This study follows the same approach in using ‘Pre-Period’ to isolate the ‘static market 
reaction’. ‘Pre-Period’ data was captured from 90 days to 1 day prior to the event and control 
periods.  
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Figure 1 Illustrations of Pre- and Post- Event Window 
 
To examine the market reaction following financial reporting tweets, this study uses the 
following proxies: the weighted average bid-ask spread and percentage of share trading 
volume as the proxy for bid-ask spread and share trading volume, respectively, in line with 
Frino et al. (2011). 
Proxy name Definition 
EventSpread The weighted average bid-ask spread during event period 
ControlSpread The weighted average bid-ask spread during control period 
EventVolume The percentage of trading volume during event period 
ControlVolume The percentage of trading volume during control period 
PreEventSpread The weighted average bid-ask spread during pre-event period 
PreControlSpread The weighted average bid-ask spread during pre-control period 
EventVolume The percentage of trading volume during event period 
ControlVolume The percentage of trading volume during control period 
NewEventSpread The weighted average bid-ask spread during event period, after removing the ‘static market 
reaction’ component 
NewEventVolume The trading volume during event period, after removing the ‘static market reaction’ component 
DifSpread The difference of weighted average bid-ask spread between event and control periods 
DifVolume The difference of the percentage of trading volume between event and control periods 
NewEventSpread = EventSpread - ‘Static Market Reaction’ = EventSpread - (PreEventSpread – 
PreControlSpread); 
NewEventVolume = EventVolume - ‘Static Market Reaction’ = EventVolume – (PreEventSpread – 
PreControlSpread); 
DifSpread = NewEventSpread – ControlSpread; 
DifVolume = NewEventVolume – ControlVolume; 
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Under event methodology, one key aspect is to ensure that market reaction following the 
event is only attributable to the selected event. This is difficult as the information 
environment is constantly changing, and no one can definitively confirm that the stock 
market movement under investigation is initiated only because of certain events. Therefore, 
this study imposes several criteria in order to maximise the possibility of capturing stock 
market reaction attributable to only the selected financial reporting disclosures on Twitter. 
First of all, this study further reduces the sample of financial reporting tweets through 
comparison between financial reporting tweets and their corresponding ASX announcements. 
According to the current continuous disclosure regime in Australia, ASX listed companies 
must first report material information to ASX and wait for ASX confirmation of release, 
before they could further disseminate such material information in other corporate disclosure 
channels. Therefore, each financial reporting tweet must be accompanied by an ASX 
announcement, especially for ‘price sensitive’ information5. In this study, only the financial 
reporting tweets that are correspondent to ‘price sensitive’ ASX announcements are retained 
as valid events. This criterion ensures that the selected event would be more likely to generate 
significant market movement, as they are considered ‘price sensitive’. The second criterion 
requires that each event period can only constitute one piece of ‘price sensitive’ information. 
This is to ensure that market reaction during the event period is extremely likely to the 
selected ‘price sensitive’ information. In other words, if there are multiple pieces of ‘price 
sensitive’ information, it is difficult to determine which individual piece of ‘price sensitive’ 
information initiates the stock market movement during the selected event period. For 
example, if a company discloses a price sensitive announcement of the annual report before 
market open, then a financial reporting tweet related to this annual report is posted 30 
minutes later. This financial reporting tweet is retained as a valid event, only if the annual 
report is the only price sensitive announcement in the sole trading day. 
While previous studies (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015) recognise the relation 
between corporate disclosure on Twitter and the change in stock market information level, it 
is still necessary to such a market reaction from the angle of market microstructure. This will 
inform about the market reaction mechanism following financial reporting disclosure on 
Twitter. Therefore, this study follows and further develops the research approach from Frino 
et al. (2011). In this previous study regarding trading halt and market information 
environment, Frino et al. (2011) adopt the event methodology approach to treat each trading 
                                                            
5 ASX categorises announcement as whether this announcement is price sensitive or not.  
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halt as an individual event. To isolate the change of market information environment that was 
not due to the trading halt, Frino et al. (2011) select control periods with a similar 
information level to their corresponding event periods, yet without the trading halt. Further, 
in order to control the time and day effect, these selected control periods must be at a similar 
time and day as their corresponding event periods. This comparative setting provides an ideal 
environment to examine the impact of trading halt on market information environment. The 
present study also uses a comparative setting as per Frino et al. (2011) to examine the market 
reaction following financial reporting disclosure on Twitter.  
In order to construct an ideal comparative setting, this study imposes two criteria for the 
selection of control periods. First, the selected control period must contain only one piece of 
‘price sensitive’ information, which ensures that all stock market reactions are more likely to 
be initiated by the corresponding ‘price sensitive’ information. Further, such ‘price sensitive’ 
information in the control period must be the same type of information as the event period. 
This is to ensure that the market reaction manner is likely to be similar between event and 
control periods. Similar to Frino et al. (2011), in order to control for the time and day effect, 
the control period must be at a similar time and day to the corresponding event period. For 
example, if both the ASX announcement and the financial reporting tweet are disclosed 
before the market open, then in the selected control period, the same type of ‘price sensitive’ 
information must be disclosed through the ASX platform before the market open. The above 
selection criteria for corresponding control period ensure that the market reaction in the 
control period is most likely associated with the one ‘price sensitive’ announcement during 
the control period.  
 
Results  
Sample Description 
This study has a full sample of 183 financial reporting tweets and a matched sample of 128 
financial reporting events. Based on the timing of the financial reporting tweet and ASX 
announcement, these financial reporting events were further categorised into four different 
types, as illustrated in Table 1. For example, if both financial reporting tweet and ASX 
announcement were disclosed outside of ASX trading hours, then this is recognised as a 
‘Type A’ financial event. 
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Table 1. Categorisation of Financial Reporting Events Based on Timing of Disclosure 
Timing of Financial 
Reporting Tweet 
Timing of ASX Announcement 
Outside of Trading Hours Within Trading Hours 
Outside of Trading Hours A C 
Within Trading Hours B D 
Volume 
Table 2 & 3 present the differences in median percentages of trading volume between the 
four types of financial reporting events. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, for ASX 
announcements that were accompanied by financial reporting tweet, at 75-90 minutes 
following the market open, the percentages of trading volumes are 0.822% and 1.05% higher 
(significant at the 1% and 5% level) compared to the percentage of trading volume during the 
corresponding control announcement interval (for scenario A). Similarly, such increase in 
trading volume is also observed for scenarios B and D. However, this increase in trading 
volume is not recorded in scenario C, in which the ASX announcement is released within 
market trading hours, and the financial reporting tweet is disclosed outside of market trading 
hours. It is possible that by this later time the market has already digested the content of the 
ASX announcement.  
Weighted Average Bid-Ask Spread 
Table 2 & 3 also present the difference in median weighted average bid-ask spread for the 
different categories of financial reporting events. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, for ASX 
announcements that were accompanied by financial reporting tweet 15-30 minutes following 
the market open (interval 2), weighted average bid-ask spread are 0.078 and 0.066 smaller 
(significant at the 5% level) compared to the weighted average bid-ask spread in the 
corresponding control announcement interval. For scenario D, the weighted average bid-ask 
spread is significantly reduced, after an extensive 6 hours 15 minutes following the finanacial 
reporting tweet. This indicates that it took longer for the market to review and react to the 
financial reporting tweet, if both ASX announcement and financial reporting tweet were 
disclosed during market trading hours. 
The Impact of Market Capital Size and Frequency of Financial Reporting Tweets  
As discussed in previous literature (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015), the size of 
market capital and frequency of financial reporting tweets are related to the market reaction 
14 | P a g e  
 
during the event period, where corporate disclosure is released on Twitter. Therefore, this 
study further separates the financial reporting events in scenario A, based on whether the 
ASX listed company discloses more than one financial reporting tweet in the event period, 
and the size of their market capital. 
Table 4 presents the statistics from Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test under scenario A, based on 
whether ASX listed companies disclose multiple financial reporting tweets following the 
ASX announcement. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, 75 minutes following the market open, 
the percentage of trading volumes are 0.797% and 1.572% higher (significant at the 5% level) 
compared to the percentage of trading volume during the corresponding control 
announcement interval (both for non-repeat and repeat financial reporting tweets). Further, 
there are more records for significantly higher percentage of trading volume for repeat 
financial reporting tweets. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, for ASX announcements that are 
accompanied with financial reporting tweet, 15-30 minutes following the market open 
(interval 2), the weighted average bid-ask spread is 0.292 smaller (significant at the 5% level) 
than the weighted average bid-ask spread in the corresponding control announcement interval. 
However, this phenomenon is only recorded for repeat financial reporting tweets. In fact, for 
listed companies with non-repeat financial reporting tweets under scenario A, there is a 
record of larger weighted average bid-ask spread at two hours after the disclosure of the 
financial reporting tweet. These findings show that while the market responds with high 
percentage of trading volume, following financial reporting disclosure on Twitter the 
approach of repeat disclosure of financial reporting tweets could have greater benefit for 
listed companies in reducing information asymmetry, represented as smaller weighted 
average bid-ask spread and higher percentage of share trading volume.  
Table 5 presents the statistics from the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test under scenario A, based 
on the size of market capital between ASX listed companies. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
90 minutes following the market open, the percentage of trading volumes is 1.688% higher 
(significant at the 5% level) than percentage of trading volume during the corresponding 
control announcement interval. This is only recorded for small market capital size ASX listed 
companies. Contrary to the expectation in Hypothesis 2, between one and two hours 
following the market open, the weighted average bid-ask spread are 0.072 and 0.0288 larger 
(significant at the 5% level) than the weighted average bid-ask spread in the corresponding 
control announcement interval (for both large and small market capital size ASX listed 
companies). These findings reveal a different outcome of non-repeat financial reporting 
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tweets. As not enough information is provided, limited financial reporting disclosure on 
Twitter may actually worsen the information environment, represented as larger weighted 
average bid-ask spread following the financial reporting tweet. Further, the above finding of 
greater percentage of trading volume only for small market capital size ASX listed companies 
is consistent with previous literature (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015), in which 
they also find that small market capital size listed companies receive greater advantage by 
increasing their disclosure on Twitter. 
The above discussions indicate that the stock market responds in unique ways dependent on 
the distinct timings between ASX announcement and corresponding financial reporting 
disclosure on Twitter. In general, financial reporting tweets that inform the stock market 
regarding an ASX announcement that was disclosed outside normal trading hours would 
reduce the information asymmetry level. For ASX announcements and financial reporting 
tweets that are both disclosed outside trading hours, a repeat disclosure of financial reporting 
on Twitter could generate a higher percentage of trading volume and lower bid-ask spread. 
Consistent with previous literature, small market capital ASX listed companies would benefit 
more from financial reporting disclosure on Twitter. 
 
Conclusion 
Recently, the use of social media for corporate disclosure, especially financial reporting, has 
received popular interest. While previous literature focus mainly on the relation between 
financial reporting on Twitter and information asymmetry, this study aims to reveal the 
market mechanism following financial reporting tweets. Through detailed examination of 
trading data, this study presents different market reactions to various scenarios of financial 
reporting on social media. The greater percentage of trading volume and smaller weighted 
average bid-ask spread observe indicate that the use of Twitter for financial reporting is 
highly desirable. This paper makes a significant contribution to the field of financial reporting 
on social media. It also provides key information best practice for industry practitioners and 
regulators, especially for small market capital ASX listed companies. One of the limitations 
of this study is its relatively small sample size. Further examination is recommended that 
expands on sample size. Future directions also include the replication of this study approach 
to address other regulatory settings to examine different market reactions.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 2 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Result for Scenarios A and C 
(Coefficients that are significant at 5% and 1% levels using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are marked with *, **, respectively.) 
Scenarios A C 
  % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-
Ask Spread 
 % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-
Ask Spread 
 Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size 
10:00 60 0.00224 0.06255 -0.00110 0.05309 14 0.01078 -0.17830 0.00161 -0.06525 
10:15 60 0.00924 0.02933 -0.00078* 0.16800 14 0.01664 -0.04623 0.00163 -0.05339 
10:30 60 -0.00457 0.03852 0.00039 0.03495 14 -0.00285 -0.15188 -0.00128 -0.14830 
10:45 60 -0.00265 0.08799 0.00028 0.01949 14 -0.00376 -0.00593 -0.00039 -0.13643 
11:00 60 -0.00097 0.00813 0.00055 0.11626 14 0.00973 -0.04623 0.00113 -0.24320 
11:15 60 0.00822** 0.22016 0.00000 0.12768 14 -0.01069 -0.19150 0.00008 -0.01780 
11:30 60 0.0105* 0.17846 -0.00050 0.08803 14 -0.01741 -0.16016 -0.00021 -0.06525 
11:45 60 -0.00031 0.08941 0.00060** 0.26007 14 -0.00874 -0.19150 0.00060 -0.01780 
12:00 60 0.00080 0.01520 -0.00018 0.07191 14 -0.00676* -0.34999 0.00036 -0.26693 
12:15 60 0.00473 0.12333 0.00048 0.04234 14 0.005715 -0.21538 -0.000123 -0.19873 
12:30 60 0.00191 0.02721 0.00030 0.13508 14 -0.01282 -0.28395 -0.00007 -0.01780 
12:45 60 -0.00052 0.02792 -0.00010 0.01814 14 0.00051 -0.00660 0.00012 -0.11270 
13:00 60 0.00103 0.01025 0.00079** 0.21975 14 -0.00288 -0.03302 -0.00062 -0.02966 
13:15 60 0.00097 0.01732 -0.00034 0.03629 14 0.01322 -0.16509 -0.00027 -0.14830 
13:30 60 0.00168 0.06608 -0.00052* 0.18749 14 -0.00916 -0.24433 -0.00062 -0.19575 
13:45 60 -0.00107 0.01520 -0.00070 0.09879 14 -0.00199 -0.19150 0.00062 -0.12457 
14:00 60 0.00163 0.03357 -0.00054 0.03696 14 -0.00095 -0.00660 -0.00043 -0.04152 
14:15 60 -0.00007 0.05972 -0.00019 0.02150 14 0.00005 -0.11226 0.00037 -0.07711 
14:30 60 0.00328* 0.15443 -0.00101 0.02688 14 -0.00361 -0.17830 0.00193 -0.26693 
14:45 60 -0.00426** 0.23359 -0.00083 0.08736 14 0.01219 -0.07264 0.00059 -0.26693 
15:00 60 -0.00104 0.06608 -0.00069 0.03427 14 -0.00262 -0.17830 -0.00040 -0.11270 
15:15 60 0.00285 0.01732 -0.00057 0.06720 14 0.00529 -0.17830 0.00077 -0.24320 
15:30 60 -0.00416* 0.15302 -0.00041 0.03763 14 0.01388 -0.07264 -0.00010 -0.06525 
15:45 60 0.00036 0.07032 -0.00014 0.02150 14 -0.01765 -0.16509 -0.00019 -0.02966 
16:00 60 -0.00609 0.08870 0.00316** 0.24932 14 -0.00641 -0.01981 0.00038 -0.07711 
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Table 3 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Result for Scenarios B and D 
(Coefficients that are significant at 5% and 1% levels using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are marked with *, **, respectively.) 
Scenarios B D 
   % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-
Ask Spread 
 % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-
Ask Spread 
Time Interval Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect 
Size 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size 
N0215 -9 13 -0.01286 -0.29467 0.00047 -0.03426 10 0.01075 -0.07977 -0.00037 -0.19373 
N0200 -8 15 0.00601 -0.09333 0.00052 -0.02074 10 -0.00770 -0.03419 -0.00023 -0.17094 
N0145 -7 17 -0.01962 -0.29632 -0.00023 -0.05277 12 0.01934 -0.06405 -0.00178 -0.28823 
N0130 -6 17 -0.00206 -0.09336 0.00044 -0.14207 15 -0.01984* -0.34219 0.00024 0.00000 
N0115 -5 20 0.00415 -0.10625 0.00012 -0.05313 15 0.02280 -0.07259 0.00100 -0.29035 
N0100 -4 24 0.00309 -0.11959 -0.00101 -0.07423 15 0.00418 -0.13480 0.00035 -0.22813 
N0045 -3 26 0.00794 -0.22717 -0.00004 -0.03698 16 0.00264 -0.19196 -0.00012 -0.05485 
N0030 -2 29 0.01797 -0.21153 -0.00024 -0.12919 17 0.00936 -0.10960 -0.00040 -0.04465 
N0015 -1 32 0.00122 -0.20803 -0.00013 -0.18699 17 0.00961 -0.26385 -0.00031 -0.07712 
 0           
P0015 1 37 0.01393 -0.01314 -0.00009 -0.06928 17 -0.00008 -0.11765 -0.00073 -0.03653 
P0030 2 37 0.00961 -0.07975 -0.00066* -0.22006 17 0.01331* -0.34506 -0.00028 -0.06088 
P0045 3 36 -0.01274 -0.17029 0.00001 -0.03889 16 0.00032 -0.09139 -0.00095 -0.10978 
P0100 4 36 0.00326 -0.05928 0.00010 -0.08886 17 -0.02240 -0.14200 -0.00029 -0.02024 
P0115 5 36 0.00220 -0.00554 -0.00090 -0.07590 17 -0.00383 -0.23135 -0.00032 -0.21506 
P0130 6 36 0.00639 -0.04808 -0.00038 -0.00365 17 0.01052 -0.10959 0.00057 -0.23135 
P0145 7 36 0.00563 -0.08886 -0.00056* -0.23888 16 -0.00451 -0.11879 -0.00018 -0.05480 
P0200 8 36 0.00269 -0.02593 -0.00109 -0.07778 16 -0.01154 -0.08220 -0.00029 0.00000 
P0215 9 35 -0.00566 -0.08032 -0.00007 -0.14677 16 -0.00674 -0.10059 -0.00048 -0.10978 
P0230 10 34 -0.00269 -0.05493 0.00045 -0.14407 16 0.00206 -0.07319 -0.00052 -0.07319 
P0245 11 34 -0.00913 -0.18348 -0.00042 -0.00521 16 -0.00573 -0.07319 -0.00102 -0.22857 
P0300 12 34 0.01080 -0.11508 0.00016 -0.09228 16 -0.00745 -0.11879 -0.00015 -0.13718 
P0315 13 34 -0.00328 -0.03420 -0.00015 -0.09641 16 0.00081 -0.01821 -0.00020 -0.02740 
P0330 14 34 0.00329* -0.20215 0.00080* -0.20215 16 -0.01078 -0.10059 0.00010 -0.06399 
P0345 15 34 0.00448* -0.22495 0.00044 -0.14200 16 -0.00568 -0.07319 0.00023 -0.10059 
P0400 16 34 0.00241 -0.02183 0.00024* -0.21246 16 0.00185 -0.05480 -0.00053 -0.16458 
P0415 17 33 -0.00217 -0.15940 0.00068 -0.06708 16 0.00557 -0.10059 0.00015 -0.12799 
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P0430 18 33 0.00222 -0.04284 -0.00014 -0.15066 16 -0.00088 -0.05480 0.00053 -0.22857 
P0445 19 33 0.00027 -0.03853 0.00010 -0.15288 16 -0.00186 -0.00919 0.00012 -0.05480 
P0500 20 33 0.00406 -0.10229 0.00019 -0.19030 16 -0.01499* -0.30158 -0.00165 -0.18279 
P0515 21 32 -0.00256 -0.05138 0.00019 -0.11925 16 0.00913 -0.10978 -0.00005 -0.03659 
P0530 22 31 -0.00140 -0.07963 -0.00021 -0.07709 16 0.00154 -0.11879 0.00108 -0.26517 
P0545 23 30 0.01312 -0.16602 0.00077 -0.09424 16 0.00169 -0.10978 0.00000 -0.21938 
P0600 24 29 0.00683 -0.00420 0.00026 -0.07813 15 -0.01543 -0.18659 0.00005 -0.03104 
P0615 25 29 0.00231 -0.06395 0.00049 -0.00420 15 -0.00663 -0.20740 -0.00031* -0.31111 
P0630 26 24 -0.00429 -0.16498 -0.00009 -0.09079 15 -0.01533 -0.03104 -0.00017 -0.15555 
P0645 27 24 0.01661 -0.13611 -0.00002 -0.01645 15 0.00736 -0.15555 -0.00024 0.00000 
P0700 28 23 0.01341 -0.21084 -0.00006 -0.08065 13 -0.01045 -0.17141 -0.00045** -0.51402 
P0715 29 22 0.00538 -0.07101 -0.00008 -0.18347 12 -0.00504 -0.11206 -0.00144 -0.32027 
P0730 30 21 0.00433 -0.00802 -0.00017 -0.16896 12 -0.00267 -0.04797 -0.00152* -0.40029 
P0745 31 21 0.00324 -0.10462 0.00022 -0.12607 10 -0.00466* -0.48992 -0.00095* -0.37611 
P0800 32 21 0.00129 -0.22791 -0.00011 -0.11002 10 -0.01192 -0.14825 -0.00134* -0.39891 
P0815 33 20 0.00278 -0.02356 0.00036 -0.17124 9 0.00330 -0.04196 -0.00012 -0.29321 
P0830 34 20 0.01058 -0.35418 0.00308 -0.34232 9 0.01336 -0.34908 -0.00136** -0.62838 
P0845 35 20 -0.00396 -0.14167 -0.00001 -0.17709 9 0.00945 -0.06977 -0.00076 -0.32103 
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Table 4 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Result for Repeat and Non-Repeat Financial Reporting Tweet Under Scenario A 
(Coefficients that are significant at 5% and 1% levels using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are marked with *, **, respectively.) 
 A – Non-Repeat Financial Reporting Tweet A – Repeat Financial Reporting Tweet 
  % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-
Ask Spread 
 % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-Ask 
Spread 
Time 
Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect 
Size 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect 
Size 
Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size 
10:00 44 0.00119 0.06096 0.00074 0.02488 16 0.03352 0.02774 -0.00094 0.09141 
10:15 44 0.00889 0.09952 0.00050 0.09082 16 -0.00412 0.20530 -0.00292* 0.35650 
10:30 44 -0.00763 0.07340 0.00070 0.14307 16 0.01049 0.04994 -0.00035 0.23766 
10:45 44 0.00185 0.07837 0.00036 0.07215 16 0.00347 0.08323 0.00009 0.10055 
11:00 44 0.00612 0.04976 0.00056 0.07215 16 -0.01592 0.17201 0.00059 0.24680 
11:15 44 0.00797* 0.18287 0.00054 0.13062 16 0.01572* 0.31628 -0.00008 0.11883 
11:30 44 0.00889 0.14929 -0.00031 0.03981 16 0.01050 0.27189 -0.00183* 0.38392 
11:45 44 -0.00105 0.02115 0.00096** 0.28489 16 0.00270* 0.29408 -0.00046 0.17368 
12:00 44 -0.00014 0.01990 -0.00026 0.03608 16 0.00485 0.03884 0.00001 0.15540 
12:15 44 0.00559 0.06593 0.00076 0.12814 16 0.00615 0.21640 -0.00114 0.19196 
12:30 44 0.00143 0.03359 0.00040 0.12565 16 0.00283 0.23859 -0.00046 0.14625 
12:45 44 -0.00017 0.03359 0.00032 0.03359 16 -0.00200 0.03884 -0.00131 0.00914 
13:00 44 -0.00040 0.03235 0.00106* 0.23388 16 0.00064 0.09433 -0.00009 0.15540 
13:15 44 0.00089 0.12192 -0.00021 0.03857 16 0.00421* 0.34957 -0.00132 0.00000 
13:30 44 0.00124 0.05598 0.00002 0.15302 16 0.00479 0.11652 -0.00142 0.25595 
13:45 44 0.00021 0.01244 -0.00021 0.12938 16 0.00457 0.13872 -0.00068 0.02742 
14:00 44 0.00109 0.01120 -0.00014 0.01493 16 0.00059 0.10543 -0.00097 0.09141 
14:15 44 0.00015 0.11694 0.00001 0.00498 16 -0.00117 0.10543 -0.00053 0.08227 
14:30 44 0.00102 0.12316 -0.00115 0.05474 16 0.00807 0.26079 -0.00071 0.06399 
14:45 44 -0.00415** 0.28737 -0.00054 0.14555 16 -0.00511 0.08323 -0.00050 0.03656 
15:00 44 0.00051 0.01617 -0.00053 0.11818 16 -0.00843* 0.29408 -0.00078 0.20110 
15:15 44 0.00363 0.02239 -0.00075 0.04479 16 0.00118 0.00555 0.00049* 0.32907 
15:30 44 -0.00451 0.16297 -0.00065 0.12192 16 -0.00377 0.08323 0.00025 0.19196 
15:45 44 -0.00075 0.10823 -0.00024 0.01742 16 -0.00014 0.04994 0.00039 0.14625 
16:00 44 -0.00277 0.02612 0.00149** 0.16048 16 -0.01278 0.24969 0.00803** 0.44790 
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Table 5 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Result for Large and Small Market Capital Size Companies Under Scenario A – Non-Repeat Category 
(Coefficients that are significant at 5% and 1% levels using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are marked with *, **, respectively.) 
 A – Non-Repeat Financial Reporting Tweet – Large A – Non-Repeat Financial Reporting Tweet – Small 
  % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-
Ask Spread 
 % Trading Volume Weighted Average Bid-
Ask Spread 
Time 
Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect 
Size 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect 
Size 
Number 
of Events 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect 
Size 
Difference 
(Event-
Control) 
Effect Size 
10:00 23 -0.00270 0.04933 -0.00139 0.03588 21 0.00056 0.07240 0.00102 0.02413 
10:15 23 -0.00065 0.22871 -0.00120 0.18386 21 0.00382 0.04559 0.00004 0.02413 
10:30 23 -0.00014 0.02242 0.00025 0.02691 21 -0.00862 0.14213 0.00168 0.23866 
10:45 23 0.01320 0.20180 0.00065 0.23319 21 -0.00618 0.03486 0.00011 0.08849 
11:00 23 0.01086 0.15247 0.00072* 0.31840 21 -0.00766 0.04559 -0.00073 0.13140 
11:15 23 0.00396 0.15696 0.00012 0.07175 21 0.01473 0.23866 0.00153 0.19576 
11:30 23 0.00289 0.00897 0.00006 0.00448 21 0.01688* 0.29766 -0.00117 0.08313 
11:45 23 0.00098 0.17489 0.00001 0.12108 21 -0.01170 0.07777 0.00288** 0.48537 
12:00 23 0.00835 0.19732 -0.00007 0.17489 21 -0.00277 0.10995 -0.00082 0.08849 
12:15 23 0.00671 0.13005 0.00039 0.17938 21 0.01053 0.03486 0.00134 0.09922 
12:30 23 -0.00372 0.08072 0.00051 0.08072 21 0.00956 0.03486 0.00100 0.14213 
12:45 23 0.00128 0.11660 0.00015 0.07624 21 -0.00112 0.02950 0.00343 0.13140 
13:00 23 -0.00008 0.00897 0.00027* 0.30046 21 -0.00326 0.12604 0.00089 0.15822 
13:15 23 0.00259 0.00448 -0.00012 0.16144 21 -0.00033 0.23866 -0.00053 0.07777 
13:30 23 0.00173 0.02242 -0.00011 0.14350 21 -0.00077 0.08849 0.00058 0.12067 
13:45 23 0.00009 0.05381 -0.00020 0.05381 21 0.00720 0.04559 -0.00040 0.19576 
14:00 23 0.00183 0.07175 -0.00035 0.04036 21 0.00124 0.04559 -0.00024 0.06168 
14:15 23 0.00170 0.21525 -0.00051 0.04484 21 -0.00758 0.08313 0.00124 0.06168 
14:30 23 0.00096 0.08072 -0.00044 0.16592 21 0.00838 0.14213 0.00039 0.07240 
14:45 23 -0.00395* 0.31391 -0.00112 0.24216 21 -0.00635* 0.25475 0.00055 0.07777 
15:00 23 -0.00546 0.04484 -0.00085 0.07624 21 0.00364 0.08849 0.00013 0.16358 
15:15 23 -0.00935* 0.25561 -0.00084 0.12108 21 0.01048 0.22794 0.00047 0.05631 
15:30 23 0.00628 0.04484 -0.00006 0.03588 21 -0.02141* 0.26548 -0.00147 0.21721 
15:45 23 -0.00553* 0.32736 0.00012 0.11211 21 0.01784 0.08313 -0.00016 0.10995 
16:00 23 -0.01637 0.13902 0.00106 0.17489 21 0.00950 0.10458 0.00356 0.16894 
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